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Network Architecture and Mutual Monitoring in 
Public Goods Experiments 
 
Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual 
monitoring and costly punishment are allowed. All these experiments, however, study 
monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and punish each other 
(i.e., in a complete network). The architecture of social networks becomes important when 
individuals can only monitor and punish the other individuals to whom they are connected by 
the network. We study several non-trivial network architectures that give rise to their own 
distinctive patterns of behavior. Nevertheless, a number of simple, yet fundamental, 
properties in graph theory allow us to interpret the variation in the patterns of behavior that 
arise in the laboratory and to explain the impact of network architecture on the efficiency and 
dynamics of the experimental outcomes. 
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 1 Introduction
A perennial question in economics concerns the conditions under which self-interested indi-
viduals cooperate to achieve socially eﬃcient outcomes. In a seminal experiment, Fehr and
Gäechter (2000) showed that public goods can be provided at high levels if individuals can
monitor the contributions made by other individuals and punish those who are unwilling to
contribute. This stands in stark contrast to the experimental results from the familiar public
good game in the literature, in which low provision is common (Ledyard, 1995). A number
of experimental papers extend Fehr and Gäechter (2000) by making punishment more or less
costly to the monitor (Anderson and Putterman, 2005), making punishment only symbolic
(Masclet, et al., 2003), or by going in the opposite direction and equating punishment with
expulsion from the group (Cinyabuguma, et al., 2005) and continue to ﬁnd high levels of
provision.
A central assumption of nearly all these experiments is full monitoring — everyone can
monitor all of the other individuals. In reality, individuals living in any society are bound
together by a social network, and often they can only monitor the behavior of those who are
in their local environment. If each individual monitors the actions of only a small number
of other individuals, it is not clear that mutual monitoring can give rise to cooperative
outcomes. Clearly, partial monitoring can be an obstacle to cooperation if, for example,
a critical mass of potential punishers is required to deter shirking or punishers are only
emboldened to intervene when they know that they are supported by others.
We represent the partial monitoring structure by a graph that speciﬁes the monitoring
technology of the group; that is, who monitors whose actions. Each player is located at a
node of the graph, and player i can monitor player j if and only if there is an edge leading
from node i to node j. The experiments reported here involve the eight networks [1]-[8]
illustrated in Figure 1 below. An arrow pointing from player i to player j indicates that
i can monitor and punish j. The goal of this paper is to identify the impact of network
architecture on the eﬀectiveness of mutual monitoring and punishment. The set of networks
depicted in Figure 1 has several interesting architectures exemplifying a number of simple yet
fundamental concepts in graph theory (deﬁned in the next section) that allow us to interpret
variation in the experimental outcomes.
[Figure 1 here]
Our key results are as follows:
• Cooperation — Although contributions vary dramatically from network to network,
connected networks [1]-[4], within which everyone is monitored, demonstrate signiﬁ-
1cantly higher contributions than disconnected networks [5]-[8]; however, the complete
network [1] does not elicit signiﬁcantly more contributions than the other connected
networks.
• Punishment — More punishment is used to maintain or increase contributions in
directed networks such as [2], [5], [6], and [7] where the edges point in only one direction
relative to undirected networks. Our conclusion is that the asymmetry in the relations
between any pair of nodes in directed networks gives diﬀerent monitoring roles to
diﬀerent subjects, which, in turn, increases punishment expenditures.
• Eﬃciency — While there is also considerable variation in net payoﬀs after subtractions
for punishing others and for being punished across networks, the connected networks
(such as [1] and [4]) are the most eﬃcient, whereas the disconnected networks (e.g., [6]
and [7]) are the least eﬃcient. In addition, adding/removing edges does not necessarily
increase/decease eﬃciency.
Among our other conclusions, the fact that we ﬁnd it is necessary to take into account
the details of the local neighborhood as well as the entire network architecture to explain
individual behavior is particularly relevant for future work. The simple summary character-
istics of the networks depicted in Figure 1, such as the average distance between players, do
not fully account for the subtle and complicated behaviors that we observe. To determine
the important determinants of individual behavior, it will be necessary to investigate a larger
class of networks in the laboratory. This is perhaps one of the most important topics for
future research.
The paper contributes to the enormous body of experimental work on public goods, but
we will not attempt to review this literature. The most closely related papers to ours are
those that also allow for costly punishment by Carpenter (2007) and O’Gorman, et al. (2008).
Carpenter (2007) compared the complete network [1] to two other connected networks, the
directed circle [2] and the undirected circle [3]. Carpenter (2007) found that contributions
in the complete network [1] are as high as in the undirected circle [3] but are signiﬁcantly
higher than in the directed circle [2]; however, the number of other potential punishers, not
the network structure was emphasized. O’Gorman, et al. (2008) compared the complete
network [1] to a version of the directed star [5] in which the responsibility of being the
“prison guard” changed randomly each round and found that the complete network is less
eﬃcient. These results, though based on diﬀerent designs and reporting some diﬀerence in
results are important primarily because they suggest that the network architecture aﬀects
the provision of the public good. Nevertheless, a more sophisticated and comprehensive
analysis is required to detect the underlying properties of networks that facilitate or hinder
2cooperative outcomes. Our paper also contributes to the large and growing literature on
the economics of networks (see Jackson, 2008) and the smaller, more recent, literature on
network experiments (see Kosfeld, 2004).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the network
concepts that guided our experimental design and the design itself. Section 3 provides our
empirical analysis, Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 provides some concluding
thoughts.
2 Experimental Design
The voluntary contribution game that we study can be interpreted as follows. At the ﬁrst
stage, players simultaneously make voluntary contributions to a public good. The payoﬀ for
each player at the ﬁrst stage equals his consumption of the public good plus his remaining
endowment. At the end of the ﬁrst stage, players are allowed to monitor the contributions
of the players to whom they are connected by a social network, where nodes represent
players and edges represent the possibility of one player monitoring the player to whom the
edge is pointing. Thus, we drop the standard assumption that individual contributions are
public information and assume that players can monitor the contributions of some, but not
necessarily all, of the other players. In the second stage, players are given the opportunity
to punish, at some cost, the other players to whom they are connected by the network. The
terminal payoﬀ for each player from both stages is given by the maximum of either zero
or her payoﬀ from the ﬁrst stage minus the punishment received and the cost of punishing
other players.
2.1 The networks
We restrict attention to the case of four-person networks, which has several non-trivial
architectures. Each network is represented by a graph with four nodes, indexed by i =
A,B,C,D, where at each node there is a single player. An edge between any two players
represents that they are connected and the arrowhead points to the player whose action can
be monitored. For each player i, Ni denotes the set of players j  = i who can be monitored by
i. We can think of Ni as representing player i’s neighborhood. The collection of neighborhoods
{NA,NB,NC,ND} completely deﬁne a four-person network. The set of networks used in the
experimental design is illustrated in Figure 1. Note that edges can be directed: the fact
that player i can monitor player j (j ∈ Ni) does not necessarily imply that j can monitor i
(i ∈ Nj).
Next, we deﬁne some key graph theoretic concepts to which we refer throughout the
3paper. Our notation and deﬁnitions are standard, but to avoid ambiguity we present the
concepts in some detail.
• A complete network is a network in which each pair of nodes is connected by an edge.
Otherwise, the network is incomplete. Referring to Figure 1, in the complete network
[1] every player directly monitors every other player. The rest of the networks [2]-[8]
we study are incomplete.
• A network is connected if every pair of players i and j is linked by a path and discon-
nected otherwise.1 Obviously, players from disconnected components of a network can-
not monitor each other. Referring to Figure 1, networks [1]-[4] are connected whereas
networks [5]-[8] are disconnected. Networks [7] and [8] are disconnected, but connect-
edness is satisﬁed in a subgraph {NA,NB,NC} in which every pair of players i and j
are connected.
• A network is undirected if the relations between any pairs of nodes is symmetric, so
that each edge points in both directions. Otherwise, the network is directed. A directed
network in which each edge is given a unique direction is called an oriented network. In
an oriented network, if player i can monitor player j (j ∈ Ni) then j cannot monitor i
(i / ∈ Nj). As shown in Figure 1 above, in our experimental design all directed networks
[2], [5], [6], and [7] are oriented. Networks [1], [3], [4], and [8] are undirected as all
edges are bidirected and point to both nodes at once.
• The degree of a node is the number of edges that end at that node. In a directed
graph the degree is usually divided into the out-degree and the in-degree. The out-
degree (resp. in-degree) of node i is the number of edges with i as their initial (rep.
terminal) node. Clearly, the out-degree of player i is the number of players j that can
be monitored by i (j ∈ Ni) and the in-degree of player i is the number of players j
that can monitor i (i ∈ Nj).
2.2 The game
The game is formally described using the following notation. Each player i = A,B,C,D
is endowed with y indivisible tokens. At stage one, the players simultaneously choose how
many tokens 0 ≤ gi ≤ y to contribute to the provision of the public good. The payoﬀ for
1Put precisely, for any pair of players i and j, a path from i to j is a sequence i1,...,iK such that i1 = i,
iK = j and there is an edge pointing from ik to ik+1 for k = 1,...,K − 1. Player i is connected to j if there
is a path from i to j.
4each player i in the ﬁrst stage can be summarized by
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and α is the marginal per capita return (MPCR). Hence, each player receives the value
of the public good (α¯ g) in addition to the number of tokens retained from his endowment
(y − gi). To avoid trivialities, we assume that 1 > α > 1
4. This condition ensures that
contributing is, on one hand, socially eﬃcient, and on the other hand, strictly dominated for
any individual player.
At stage two, after players are informed about the individual contributions of the members
of their group, they can punish the players to whom they are connected in the network. More




i tokens. Reducing the payoﬀ of other players is costly. The cost of reducing one
token from any of the other players is 0 < c < 1 tokens. We also assume that each player i
can spend up to his entire payoﬀ from the ﬁrst stage π1
i towards reducing the payoﬀ π1
j of
all j ∈ Ni, and that π1
i can be reduced at the second stage to zero but the terminal payoﬀ
for the game cannot be negative. The payoﬀ of player i from both stages of the game can


















By backward induction, it follows that punishment cannot defer free riding, in any net-
work architecture. We next brieﬂy illustrate the logic of the backward induction argument
and then draw out the important implications of the theory. Since punishing is costly, each
player i will refrain from doing so at the second stage (i.e., p
j
i = 0 for all i and j ∈ Ni).
Because each player j ∈ Ni expects that player i will never punish him, his best response
is to contribute nothing in the ﬁrst stage (gj = 0). Thus, the addition of the second stage
has no eﬀect on the outcome of the ﬁrst stage which, in this ﬁnitely repeated version of the
game, is full free-riding and therefore the prediction of standard theory is that gi = 0 and
p
j
i = 0 for all i and j ∈ Ni. Note, however, that the aggregate payoﬀ is maximized if each
player i fully cooperates by contributing his endowment (gi = y).
2.3 Procedures
The experiment was run with 264 participants in 14 sessions at the Center for Experimental
Social Sciences (CESS) at New York University and at the Experimental Social Science
5Lab (Xlab) at the University of California, Berkeley. The subjects in this experiment were
recruited from all undergraduate classes and had no previous experience in public good or
networks experiments. After subjects read the instructions, they were read aloud by an
experimenter.2 At the end of the instructional period subjects were asked if they had any
questions or any diﬃculties understanding the experiment. No subject reported any diﬃculty
understanding the procedures or using the computer program. Each experimental session
lasted about an hour and a half. A $5 participation fee and subsequent earnings from playing
the game were paid in private at the end of the experimental session.
The endowment was given by y = 25 and the marginal per capita return and the cost of
punishing were ﬁxed at α = 0.4 and c = 0.5, respectively. The network was held constant
throughout a given experimental session. In each session, the network positions were labeled
A, B, C, and D. The participant’s type (A, B, C, or D) remained constant throughout
the session. Each experimental session consisted of 15 independent decision-rounds. To
minimize the investment in reputations, each round started with the computer randomly
forming four-person networks by selecting one participant of each type. The networks formed
in each round depended solely upon chance and were independent of the networks formed in
any of the other rounds.
Each round of the experiment consists of two stages, the contribution stage and the
punishment stage. The contribution decision was to allocate the endowment between a
private good which only beneﬁted the individual and a public good which beneﬁted everyone
in the group, according to the payoﬀ function (1). Once all the contributions were recorded,
subjects observed the contributions of the participants to whom they were connected by the
network. In addition, all subjects were informed about the sum of the contributions to the
public good by all the participants in their group (including themselves). In the punishment
stage, subjects choose if and by how much to reduce the ﬁrst stage payoﬀ of each of the
other participants with whom they were connected by the network. If they did not wish to
reduce the earnings of another participant they had to enter zeros. At the completion of the
two stages, the computer informed the subjects of their total payoﬀs according to the payoﬀ
function (2).
The various experimental roles are summarized in Table 1 below. The entries in the right
hand column have the form a/b where a is the number of observations and b the number of
subjects per type.
[Table 1 here]
2Sample experimental instructions, including the computer program dialog windows are available in the
Appendix and online at (http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~kariv/CKS_II_A.pdf).
63 Results
In this section we report the results of our experiment. Our analysis focuses on two impor-
tant questions. First, we ask the obvious question of whether the graph theoretic constructs
deﬁned in Section 2 above systematically aﬀect the performance of our networks. Perfor-
mance is measured in three ways: contribution levels, punishment given and overall payoﬀ
eﬃciency (i.e., payoﬀs net of punishment expenses). Second, we ask the more subtle ques-
tion of whether networks “matter” in that people’s behavior is aﬀected not only by their
immediate surroundings (their node) but also by the larger network in which that node func-
tions. Put diﬀerently, if a participant’s node is deﬁned as the number of out- and in-links
connecting him to the network, we ask whether his behavior changes as we take that node
and embed it in diﬀerent networks.
Our experimental design allows us to make direct comparisons to test the importance of
each of the properties of network architecture. For example to test the importance of the
network being complete, we compare [1] the Complete network to two other networks that
are incomplete: [3] the Undirected Circle and [4] the Undirected Star. This comparison is
salient because, while both [3] and [4] are incomplete, they are connected and undirected like
[1]. Considering connectedness, we compare [2] the Directed Circle to [6] the Line because
removing just one link renders the Directed Circle disconnected. We also compare [2] to
[7] the disconnected Directed Circle in which player D stands alone, and [3] the Undirected
Circle to [8] the disconnected Undirected Circle, another comparison in which D can escape
any punishment. To examine the impact of networks being directed, we compare [2] the
Directed Circle to [3] the Undirected Circle, [5] the Prison Guard to [4] the Undirected Star,
and [7] the disconnected Directed Circle to [8] the disconnected Undirected Circle. The only
complication here is that the comparison of [5] to [4] might be confounded by the fact that
[5] is also disconnected while [4] is not.
Because degree is mostly a property of nodes (i.e., the number of out- and in-links), its
examination eﬀectively coincides with and motivates our second question: does the behavior
at a node depend on the network in which it is embedded? In all networks any given agent
operates in a neighborhood deﬁned by the number and directionality of the links connected
to his node in the network. This agent’s node can be embedded in many diﬀerent networks,
however. Return to Figure 1, for example, and take player B in the Undirected Circle. This
player has two out-links and two in-links to agents A and C. This deﬁnes the degree of
his node. Now take the Disconnected Undirected Circle and look at player B there. That
player occupies exactly the same node as agent B in the Undirected Circle. In fact, players
A and C in both networks also occupy the same node as agent B in the Undirected Circle.
7What diﬀers is the fact that these neighborhoods are embedded in diﬀerent networks since
player D is isolated in the Disconnected Undirected Circle but connected symmetrically to
the network in the Undirected Circle. If networks matter then we would expect that the
behavior of subjects at identical nodes but diﬀerent networks would diﬀer. This would mean
that, when determining their behavior, subjects look beyond the narrow boundaries of their
local neighborhood and take into account the more global aspects of the network their node
is embedded in.
We proceed by systematically evaluating these four properties of network architecture.
Along the way we will use a combination of nonparametric rank sum tests (|z|) and propor-
tions tests (|r|). Where appropriate, we will also run parametric regressions that account for
individual heterogeneity (using random eﬀects), learning (with period ﬁxed eﬀects) and add
the appropriate controls.
3.1 Completeness
Before examining the eﬀect of completeness within our experiment, it is important to demon-
strate that there is nothing special about our procedures that could confound our results. In
other words, our results are more convincing if we can show that behavior in our complete
network is similar to what has been found in other experiments. Figure 1 is an eﬀective sum-
mary of our results. Statistics for three metrics of group performance are reported directly
next to each network so that one can begin to map outcomes onto architecture. Average
contributions in Figure 1 are measured as a fraction of the total endowment. On average,
participants contributed 56% of their endowment in our complete network. This behav-
ior is similar to the “stranger” contribution levels found by Fehr and Gaechter (2000) and
Carpenter (2007) of 58% and 61%, respectively.
[Figure 2 here]
While the Complete network elicits contributions in line with other experiments it does
not yield the highest average contributions. Indeed, the Directed Circle generates the highest
average contribution of 60% of the endowment, a rate that is statistically greater than all
networks accept the Complete. The comparisons of our undirected connected networks [1] to
[3] and [4] are the most interesting, however, because the only diﬀerence is “completeness”.
Considering the summary statistics in Figure 1 and the direct comparisons in Figure 2(a), it
does not appear that the complete network robustly results in higher contributions. While
the mean contribution pooled across rounds is slightly higher in [1] it is not signiﬁcantly
higher than [3] and only marginally signiﬁcantly higher than [4] (|z| = 0.64, p = 0.52;
|z| = 1.99, p = 0.05, respectively). In fact, when we control for individual heterogeneity and
8repeated play in column (1) of Table 2 (in which [1] is the omitted network), we do not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in contributions.
[Table 2 here]
Figure 1 also lists the unconditional probability that a “target” who contributes nothing
will be punished in each of the networks. In the Complete network [1] total free-riders are
punished 48% of the time and this rate is only slightly lower in [3] (42%) or [4] (47%).
Proportions test suggest that these rates are not diﬀerent (|r| = 0.47, p = 0.64; |r| = 0.18,
p = 0.86, respectively). While the incidence of punishment might not vary between [1] and [3]
or [4], the severity does. Summarizing punishment is tricky because punishment only makes
sense in the context of contributions. In Figure 2(b) we plot the estimated relationship
between a target’s contribution and how much the target was punished by an individual
for networks [1], [3], and [4]. As in Carpenter and Matthews (2009) we utilize a spline
speciﬁcation to allow punishment to diminish more quickly above the implied contribution
norm. In this case the “knot” that maximizes the regression F statistic, and in this sense ﬁts
the data best, occurs when 10 units are contributed - participants are punished increasingly
more below ten than above it. As one can see, punishment levels are much lower in the
Complete network. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed in column (4) of Table 2 in which we regress
positive punishment amounts on network indicators and ﬁnd that the estimated punishments
in [3] and [4] are signiﬁcantly larger than in the baseline [1].
There are two possible explanations for the punishment diﬀerences we see between the
Complete network and its closest comparisons. First, punishment levels might be lower in
complete networks because monitors are more inclined to free-ride on the punishment eﬀorts
of the other players when they know that everyone is watching everyone else. However, this
does not "jibe" with the fact that the incidences of punishment do not seem to diﬀer across
networks [1], [3], and [4]. Perhaps a better explanation is that monitors face a coordination
problem when there are many sets of eyes watching a target. Without directly communicating
to settle how much punishment should be levied and how it should be shared among the
monitors, everyone continues to punish but they are each forced estimate, on their own, how
much to reduce the severity of punishment to account for the actions of the other monitors.
Combined, relatively high contribution levels and low punishment expenditures make the
complete network one of the most eﬃcient architectures. The mean pooled payoﬀ (net of the
costs of being punished and punishing) in [1] is signiﬁcantly higher than in [3] (|z| = 4.13,
p < 0.01) and marginally signiﬁcantly higher than in [4] (|z| = 1.61, p = 0.10). These results
are mostly replicated in column (5) of Table 2 wherein individual random eﬀects and time
9period ﬁxed eﬀects are controlled for. As one can see in Figure 2(c) the performance of the
Complete network tends to improve relative to [3] and [4] as the experiment proceeds.
In sum, the Complete network does not seem to be better at eliciting contributions but,
because its punishment levels tend to be lower, it does achieve higher than average eﬃciency.
3.2 Connectedness
To compare connected to disconnected networks, one can compare the left column of Figure
1 to the right column. The contribution diﬀerences are striking: there is no disconnected
network that yields higher mean pooled contributions than the lowest performing connected
network, the Undirected Star. However, to conduct our analysis systematically, remember
we need to compare [2] to [6], [2] to [7] and [3] to [8] directly which we do in panels (a-
c) of Figure 3. In each comparison, the connected graph yields signiﬁcantly higher pooled
contributions (|z2−6| = 14.00, p < 0.01; |z2−7| = 7.31, p < 0.01; |z3−8| = 4.38, p < 0.01)
and these results are mostly robust to an analysis that controls for individual heterogeneity
and repeated game eﬀects. If one compares the point estimates in column (1) of Table 2 we
ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on [2] is higher than [6] (p < 0.01), [2] is higher than [7] (p < 0.01)
but while the diﬀerence between the point estimates on [3] and [8] goes in the anticipated
direction, it is not signiﬁcant at standard levels (p = 0.23).
[Figure 3 here]
Although the evidence is mixed, connected networks also appear to elicit at least as
much punishment, both in terms of the incidence and the level. Figure 1 suggests that
the probability of punishing a complete free-rider is higher in [2] than in [6] (|r| = 3.49,
p < 0.01), higher in [3] than in [8] (|r| = 4.38, p < 0.01) and no lower in [2] than in
[7] (|r| = 1.10, p = 0.27). The full punishment splines, panels (a-c) of Figure 4, which are
based on an analysis of all the punishment data (i.e., they include the zeros) seem to indicate
that there is more punishment in connected networks. However, considering only the positive
observations in column (4) of Table 2 the diﬀerences do not appear to be robustly signiﬁcant.
[Figure 4 here]
There also appears to be mixed evidence of an eﬃciency advantage in connected networks.
While Figure 1 indicates that [2] yields higher mean payoﬀs than [6] or [7] (|z| = 5.20,
p < 0.01; |z| = 2.49, p < 0.01, respectively), the payoﬀs in [8] actually tend to be higher
than in [3] (|z| = 1.81, p = 0.07). looking at the diﬀerence in mean payoﬀ over the 15
rounds of the game in Figure 5(a-c), we see little evidence of diﬀerences, results which are
10substantiated by comparing the coeﬃcients in column (5) of Table 2. Here only the [2]-[6]
payoﬀ diﬀerence is signiﬁcant.
To summarize, although it is clear that connected networks tend to achieve higher contri-




Directed links occur when one person can monitor another. Links become undirected when
both people can monitor each other. By comparing [2] to [3], [5] to [4] and [7] to [8] we can
examine the eﬀect of monitoring being one-way or mutual. The role of directedness seems to
depend, more than connectedness, on the basic architecture of the network. While studying
Figures 1 and 3(d-f) one can see that in the connected setting the directed [2] elicits higher
average contributions than the undirected [3] (|z| = 2.20, p = 0.03) and the undirected [4]
and [8] yield higher contributions in the star structure [5] and when one group member is
isolated [7] (|z| = 11.13, p < 0.01; |z| = 3.76, p < 0.01, respectively). Only the [5] versus
[4] diﬀerence remains signiﬁcant (p < 0.01), however, when, in column (1) of Table 2, we
include individual random eﬀects and time period ﬁxed eﬀects.
Comparing the probabilities of punishing a total free-rider in Figure 1 and the punish-
ment splines in Figure 4(d-f) we also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of directedness on punishment is
architecture-dependent. Because [2] yields the highest likelihood of a total free-rider being
punished, it is clearly higher than [3]. However, the diﬀerence is not quite statistically sig-
niﬁcant (|r| = 1.39, p = 0.16) because there are very few observations of total free-riding in
these two networks. The eﬀect of directedness reverses in this domain as well (i.e., free-riders
are more likely to be punished in the undirected network) when one compares [5] and [4] but
does not achieve statistical signiﬁcance (|r| = 1.52, p = 0.13). As one can seen in Figures 1
and 4(f), there is a large diﬀerence in the chances of a total free-rider being punished in the
disconnected circles. Here the directed graph yields both a higher instance of punishment
(|r| = 3.38, p < 0.01) and, according to the comparison of point estimates from column (4)
of Table 2, a signiﬁcantly higher level of punishment (p < 0.01).
The marginally signiﬁcant contribution and punishment diﬀerences between the directed
and undirected networks combine to provide signiﬁcant payoﬀ diﬀerences. Although not
obvious from Figures 5(d-f), the directed [2] results in higher average payoﬀs than the undi-
rected [3] (|z| = 2.06, p = 0.04), the undirected [4] yields higher payoﬀs than the directed
[5] (|z| = 7.00, p < 0.01) and the undirected [8] yields higher payoﬀs than the directed [7]
11(|z| = 3.38, p < 0.01). Except for the comparison between [2] and [3], these payoﬀ diﬀerences
remain signiﬁcant in column (5) of Table 2.
More than both completeness and connectedness, the eﬀect of directedness seems to
depend on the basic structure of the network. When the underlying network is connected,
there is some evidence that directed links lead to more cooperation, punishment and higher
payoﬀs. When the underlying structure is star-shaped, having a disconnected “prison guard”
is particularly bad for contributions and payoﬀs. Lastly, when both underlying networks
include a completely disconnected agent we ﬁnd the opposite of the connected case: directed
links in this structure lead to much more punishment but not more cooperation or higher
payoﬀs.
3.4 Degree
Recall that degree is mostly a nodal property and while our experiment was not designed to
systematically add or remove links (mostly because this would confound comparisons of the
other properties) we can now use the concept to transition from an analysis of the overall
performance of a network to analyzing the eﬀect of broader network structures on the behav-
ior of agents who occupy nodes of common degree, i.e., local “neighborhoods”. We return
to an examination of the eﬀects of the total number of links, per se, in the discussion. The
question then is do networks have an impact on the contribution and punishment behavior of
participants inhabiting identical nodes? The answer is that when the underlying structures
change signiﬁcantly they clearly do.
Since nodes can be deﬁned by the number of out- and in-links facing an agent, we can
index them as Nn,o,i , n = 1,2,....,8, o = 0,1,2,3 and i = 0,1,2,3 where Nn,o,i indicates a
subject in network n who has o out-links and i in-links. For example, N6,1,1 is the neigh-
borhood of subjects B and C in network [6] (the Line) since each of them have 1 out- and
1 in-link. Note that players A, B, C, and D in network [2] also have 1 out- and 1 in-link
(they are all deﬁned as N2,1,1 ) so they also share the same node as subjects B and C in
network [6] but they are in diﬀerent networks. For notational convenience, we simply leave
n unspeciﬁed when we consider nodes outside the context of their networks. For example,
Nn,1,1 denotes the generic 1 out- 1 in-link node. Table 3 catalogues the nodes that exist in
our experiments, the networks they are part of and the subjects types that inhabit them.
[Table 3 here]
By design, most nodes exist in several networks; however, some nodes are rare and have
only one representative as, for example, Nn,3,0 whose only inhabitant is subject A in the
Prison Guard [5]. The most frequent node is Nn,1,1 since it occurs in four networks: [2], [4],
12[6], and [7]. Other ﬂexible neighborhoods are Nn,3,3 in networks [1] and [4], Nn,2,2 in both
networks [3] and [8], the Nn,0,0 isolated subjects in networks [7] and [8], and Nn,0,1 existing
in networks [5] and [6]. Any other nodes exist in only one network and hence will not be
discussed.
As catalogued in Table 3, ﬁve of the seven nodes we study exist in more than one network.
Diﬀerences in the behavior and outcomes of agents who occupy the same node in diﬀerent
networks are depicted in Figure 6. To test for diﬀerences in nodal outcomes by network
we use nonparametirc tests and regress contributions, positive instances of punishment, and
payoﬀs on node indicators in columns (1-3) of Table 4.
[Figure 6 here]
Let us ﬁrst discuss the Nn,3,3 neighborhoods. Because neither the summary test (|z| =
0.43, p = 0.67) indicates a diﬀerence nor are the point estimates diﬀerent (p = 0.98) in
the ﬁrst column of Table 4, contributions do not seem to diﬀer for Nn,3,3 players who ﬁnd
themselves in [1] or [4]. However, the Nn,3,3 players who ﬁnd themselves at the center of
the star in [4] do punish more according to the results in the second column of Table 4
(p = 0.05) and as a result accrue lower payoﬀs (p = 0.01) than the players in [1]. Clearly,
the punishment responsibilities are more salient to the player at the star’s center. In this
sense the structure changes signiﬁcantly between N1,3,3 and N4,3,3.
[Table 4 here]
The Nn,2,2 node exists in networks [3] and [8]. The diﬀerence between these networks
is that one player is completely disconnected in [8] and all players are connected in [3].
Figure 6(b) and the summary tests suggest diﬀerences in contributions and punishment
between occupiers of the Nn,2,2 node in these two networks. Players in the connected network
contribute and punish more (|z| = 3.88, p < 0.01, |r| = 1.81, p = 0.07)3. However, in terms of
payoﬀs, the larger N3,2,2 contributions and punishments tend to “net out” out because there
is no evidence of payoﬀ diﬀerences between the two Nn,2,2 nodes (|z| = 1.11, p = 0.27). These
results suggest that having someone completely disconnected from the monitoring network
aﬀects the outcomes for the subset of connected nodes. In other words, the connected players
in [8] do not simply ignore player D. In fact, one could imagine that D becomes a scapegoat
because she does not have to fear punishment and therefore it would be easy for her to
free-ride. Ironically, Ds in [8] actually appear to play with considerable integrity because,
3While these diﬀerences survive the inclusion of period ﬁxed eﬀects in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4,
the relatively large rhos reported in Table 4 suggest that the substantial individual heterogeneity can reduce
their signiﬁcance.
13in fact, they contribute at levels comparable to the other three connected members of the
network (|z| = 0.86, p = 0.39).
We see the most variation in behavior among the Nn,1,1 nodes. The mean fraction con-
tributed of subjects in the neighborhoods of the Directed Circle (N2,1,1) was 0.60 while that
same node, when existing in either the Undirected Star (N4,1,1,), the Line (N6,1,1), or the
Disconnected Directed Circle (N7,1,1), led to contribution levels of just 0.49, 0.27, and 0.38
respectively. Using a Kruskal Wallis test we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of network on nodal
performance at better than the 1% level (χ2 = 177.37, p < 0.01).4 In short, 1-out and 1-in
link nodes elicit high contributions when embedded in connected networks with the Directed
Circle [2] being the most hospitable network for such neighborhoods and the Line [6] being
the most inhospitable network.
The impact of network structure on nodal performance can also be seen in the punishment
behavior of Nn,1,1 participants since while the mean punishment sent by subjects in the N2,1,1
neighborhoods of [2] is 2.67 it is, 0.78, 1.10, and 2.26, respectively for the Undirected star
(N4,1,1), the Line (N6,1,1), and the disconnect Directed Circle (N7,1,1). Another Kruskall-
Wallis test indicates that these diﬀerences are signiﬁcant (χ2 = 24.33, p < 0.01).5 Note
that while punishments are highest in the connected [2], they are lowest in [4] which is also
connected. This is not too surprising since in that network there are three subjects who have
the opportunity to punish the one subject in the center of the star and such a plethora of
punishers provides another coordination problem as to who will be responsible for punishing
the subject in the center of the star. Another factor that might account for the relatively
low punishment in [4] is the fact that Nn,1,1 players here have mutual links: not only can
they monitor and punish their neighbors, their neighbors can punish them. Occupiers of
the same node in [2], [6], and [7] punish one neighbor and are punished by another. Nn,1,1
monitors might show more restraint compared to the others just because they are afraid
of engaging in punishment feuds (Nikiforakis, 2008). It is also interesting that the mean
punishment levels do not diﬀer much between [2] and [7], especially because the monitors in
[7] form their own 3-person version of [2]. Again, however, it appears that the existence of
a disconnected player (D) reduces contributions.
In terms of payoﬀs, the Nn,1,1 node clearly does best in connected networks.6 If one were to
look for a common feature to explain this diﬀerence it might be that in disconnected networks
4If done pairwise, all the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant using the nonparametric rank sum tests, and most of
them survive the addition of individual random eﬀects and time period ﬁxed eﬀects in column (1) of Table
4.
5Here the N2,1,1 versus N7,1,1 and N4,1,1 versus N6,1,1 comparisons do not survive when the analysis is
done pairwise.
6While all the pairwise comparisons are signiﬁcant using the nonparametric test, only the diﬀerences
between the connected and disconnected networks survive the analysis in column (3) of Table 4.
14like 6 and 7 there exists one person who is not monitored and cannot be punished. So
despite the fact that locally subjects in these nodes seem to be playing the same monitoring-
punishment game, globally they realize that there is one player that has no incentive to
contribute. In this sense, the broader network matters.
There are two remaining types of nodes to compare: the Nn,0,1 and the Nn,0,0. Because
they all involve agents who do not punish, the four instances of these nodes are combined
in Figure 6(d). The nonparametric test suggests that players B, C, and D contribute signif-
icantly more in [5] than players D do in [6] (|z| = 4.18, p < 0.01). This can be accounted for
by the higher incidence of punishment in [5]. The behavior of players D does not appear to
depend on being in network [7] or [8]. To some extent this result makes sense because while
[5] and [6] are very diﬀerent architectures (i.e., the punishment responsibilities are consoli-
dated in [5]), there is no reason to believe ex ante that D’s experience should be diﬀerent:
she is completely isolated in both networks and only receives feedback on the group mean
contribution.
The ﬁnal aspect of nodal behavior that we can examine is the question of which links
matter the most for contributions. Is it in-links or out-links? As one might expect, in general
subjects who are not monitored contribute less than those who are and the more players are
monitored, the more they contribute. For example, in the Line subjects A (N6,1,0) cannot be
monitored but can monitor subjects B. Since N6,1,0 cannot be monitored we might expect
that she contributes very little, which in fact is true since these players contribute only 20% of
their endowments on average and this is the lowest mean contribution of any type. Regressing
contributions on the number of in-links, out-links and indicators for time periods supports
the fact that contributions are increasing in the number of in-links associated with a subject’s
neighborhood but rejects the hypothesis that out-links aﬀect contributions (βin−link = 3.51,
p < 0.01). For example, compared to A in [6] who has one out-link, D in [7] is more isolated
- N7,0,0 can neither punish nor be punished and yet subjects in that position have a mean
contribution level of 0.37.
Networks do seem to matter because nodal behavior appears to be aﬀected by signiﬁcant
changes in the architecture. For example, When punishment responsibilities are consoli-
dated in player N4,3,3, she appears to “step up” and punish more compared to the N1,3,3
monitors. Further, there is some evidence that nodes placed in one-way monitoring rela-
tionships elicit more punishment than when the same node is placed in mutual monitoring
relationships.7 The simple explanation for this is that people want to avoid sparking feuds
with their neighbors. Lastly, we see that the existence of a completely disconnected player
7The incidence of punishing a total free-rider is signiﬁcantly higher when the links are one-way (|r| = 2.53,
p = 0.01).
15can also signiﬁcantly aﬀect performance at other nodes in the network.
4 Discussion
In the previous section we examined each network property in detail, one at a time. However,
it might be helpful to combine the eﬀects of all the properties in one summary analysis. Is
it the case that these properties provide the foundation for the successes and failures seen
in Figure 1? In Table 5 we regress our three measures of network performance on all four
factors. Recall that there can be only one complete network for any ﬁxed group size so
“complete” is an indicator for network [1]. “connected” is an indicator that is one for the
networks on the left side of Figure 1 and it is zero for those on the right. Four of the eight
graphs (2, 5, 6, 7) are “directed” and we add an aggregate measure of “degree” by calculating
the total number of edges for each structure.
[Table 5 here]
Considering contributions in column one, when we control for the other properties it
appears that only one factor seems to matter: connected networks yield signiﬁcantly more
contributions than disconnected networks. The eﬀect is not only statistically signiﬁcant, ﬁve
more tokens contributed in the connected networks out of a twenty-ﬁve token endowment is
substantial.
Two factors, Complete and Directed, aﬀect the amount of punishment that is doled
out to targets. Together, these point estimates suggest an interesting interpretation. The
fact that complete networks, in which the policing of free riders is very decentralized yield
lower sanctions and directed networks in which it is the responsibility of just one person
to punish a free rider yield higher sanctions suggests that punishers face the coordination
problem mentioned above. Everyone agrees that free-riders should be punished, but without
communicating directly, it is hard to know how much to punish in decentralized networks
like the Complete [1].
When considering eﬃciency in column 3, it might be the case that punishment is too
severe in directed networks and a little punishment ambiguity helps payoﬀs in the Complete
network. When combined, all four properties signiﬁcantly aﬀect ﬁnal net payoﬀs. Not
only do those in the Complete [1] do well and those in directed graphs suﬀer because of
diﬀerences in the amount of punishment, more links reduces payoﬀs perhaps because they
tend to be used too often to punish and connected graphs do better. The eﬀect of connected
graphs is particularly interesting because it appears even after controlling for the punishment
16dynamics. In other words, part of the success of connected networks occurs for reasons
beyond their ability to distribute punishment.
Given the diﬀerences between networks opperate on the ability to monitor and punish
other players, it is important to examine the extent to which network diﬀerences in punish-
ment that arise can explain the diﬀerences that we see in contributions. Returning to the
contribution regression analysis in Table 3, in the second column we add the lag of received
punishment and the lag of contributions. We add the lag of contributions to control for level
diﬀerences: while free riders can increase their contributions substantially, high contributors
can only increase their contributions slightly regardless of how much punishment they re-
ceive. As expected, punishment is highly signiﬁcant. For each (lab) dollar of punishment
the average player receives, she increases her contribution by twenty cents. As important,
however, is the fact that the addition of punishment has reduced, compared to column (1),
all the coeﬃcients on the network indictors, some substantially. Clearly, a large part of the
variation previously attributed to the networks is really due to diﬀerences in the amount
of punishment generated by the diﬀerent networks. In column (3) of Table 3 we examine
a robustness check on our punishment analysis. The model in column (2) assumes that
participants have a common response to punishment. In column 3 we add (unreported)
interactions that allow the response to punishment to vary by network. In addition to the
added interactions also not changing the results much, a chi-squared test of the joint signif-
icance of the interactions suggests that they add nothing to column 2 (χ2 = 2.85, p = 0.90)
and so assuming a common response to punishment seems reasonable. In short, although
some diﬀerences remain, a major reason for the diﬀerences seen in contributions across the
networks is that the some networks elicit a lot of punishment and others do not.8
[Figure 7 here]
We end our discussion by speculating, based on our results, about the “optimal” number
of links in the standard four-person public good game with punishment. If, in the end, we
are mostly concerned about the eﬃciency with which public goods are provided then we
have to look at payoﬀs net of the costs of punishing and being punished. If we estimate the
eﬀect of the number of links on net payoﬀs we ﬁnd that all three coeﬃcients of a third order
polynomial speciﬁcation are signiﬁcant. The derivative of this function provides us with an
estimate of the marginal beneﬁt of adding links to the monitoring network. The marginal
beneﬁt is plotted in Figure 7. If adding links was free, as it was in the experiment, then the
8We also made sure that the mediation of the network aﬀects on contributions by adding punishment is
not due to the fact that the data from all the participants who cannot be punished (e.g., player A in the
Prison Guard) are dropped in column 2. In another regression we replaced the missing punishment values
with zeros and see that the resulting point estimates are almost identical.
17marginal cost of a link is zero. The shape is interesting and informative. We see that the
marginal beneﬁt actually becomes negative between ﬁve and nine links. In other words, it
makes sense to add links 1 through 4 or links 9 through 12 but adding links to networks that
have between 4 and 8 already seems to actually reduce average payoﬀs. The precision of
this estimate nicely summarizes the implications of our results. In three-link networks like
the Prison Guard [5] or the Line [6], the problem is straight-forward: there is not enough
monitoring, more links should be added. At the same time, networks like the Undirected
Circle [3] with eight links actually have the opposite problem. Here there is more punishment
than what can be supported by the level of contributions. Ironically, one way to reduce the
amount of punishment is to add more links because this will lower the responsibility of any
given monitor and this ambiguity seems to induce some monitors to reduce punishment to
a degree that ends up being closer to optimal.
5 Conclusions
Our experiment demonstrates that network architecture has a signiﬁcant impact on the
behavior of agents in public goods games and, therefore, on the outcomes achieved in diﬀerent
networks. While the major determinant of contribution levels appears to be whether or not
all the agents are connected, not all connected networks are equally eﬃcient since they elicit
diﬀerent punishment behavior. The Complete network, for example, yields high contribution
levels and high eﬃciencies both because and despite the fact that this architecture elicits less
punishment than other networks like the Directed Circle where punishment responsibilities
are not shared. In short, while the previous literature was correct in pointing out that
punishment may increase contributions, it ﬁled to investigate the subtle relationship between
network structure and performance. This paper has taken a ﬁrst step in that direction.

































19(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable Contribution Contribution Contribution Punishment Payoff
[2] Directed Circle 3.974 2.374 2.102 4.471*** -1.621
(3.396) (2.072) (2.095) (1.574) (1.382)
[3] Undirected Circle 0.301 -0.168 -0.268 2.811* -3.005**
(3.195) (1.946) (1.967) (1.557) (1.311)
[4] Undirected Star -1.673 -0.908 -1.108 3.069** -0.964
(2.868) (1.748) (1.767) (1.443) (1.174)
[5] Prison Guard -7.117*** -3.411** -3.716** 2.607* -3.307***
(2.656) (1.665) (1.687) (1.494) (1.086)
[6] Line -10.832*** -5.926*** -6.237*** 3.984*** -4.049***
(2.676) (1.701) (1.721) (1.425) (1.093)
[7] Disconnected Directed Circle -4.857 -2.383 -2.724 10.058*** -3.513***
(3.383) (2.224) (2.240) (1.977) (1.382)
[8] Disconnected Undirected Circle -3.022 -1.385 -1.740 3.187** -1.264
(2.987) (1.926) (1.943) (1.572) (1.225)
Lagged Punishment Received 0.214*** -0.003
(0.03) (0.25)
Lagged Contribution 0.530*** 0.530***
(0.03) (0.03)
Intercept 17.016*** 3.408** 3.702** 1.283 32.937***
(2.423) (1.546) (1.570) (1.254) (1.047)
Includes time period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Includes Punishment×Network interactions No No Yes No No
rho 0.68 0.49 0.49 0.41 0.24
Prob > Chi
2 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Obs. 3960 3080 3080 886 3960
TABLE 2: Comparing Individual Behavior and Outcomes across Networks
Note: Random effect tobit with censoring at zero and full contributions or GLS regressions . *, **, *** indicates significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
20Links Nodes (Players)
0 out | 0 in N 7,0,0 (D), N 8,0,0  (D)
0 out | 1 in N 5,0,1  (B,C,D), N 6,0,1  (D)
1 out | 0 in N 6,1,0  (A)
1 out | 1 in N 2,1,1  (A,B,C,D), N 4,1,1  (B,C,D), N 6,1,1 (B,C), N 7,1,1  (A,B,C)
2 out | 2 in N 3,2,2  (A,B,C,D), N 8,2,2  (A,B,C)
3 out | 0 in N 5,3,0  (A)
3 out | 3 in N 1,3,3 (A,B,C,D), N 4,3,3  (A,B,C,D)
TABLE 3: Nodes and Network Structures
21(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Contribution Punishment Payoff
N 5,3,0 3.883 0.483 -0.668
(2.801) (1.685) (1.241)
N 1,3,3 13.399*** -2.124 1.988
(3.365) (1.815) (1.367)
N 4,3,3 13.514*** 1.295 -2.021
(3.941) (1.939) (1.611)
N 3,2,2 13.701*** 0.686 -1.017
(3.184) (1.743) (1.297)
N 8,2,2 10.796*** 1.063 0.055
(3.150) (1.754) (1.283)
N 2,1,1 17.360*** 2.345 0.367
(3.384) (1.757) (1.367)
N 4,1,1 11.131*** 0.695 2.043*
(3.002) (1.790) (1.220)
N 6,1,1 3.749 2.911* -3.004**
(2.921) (1.742) (1.184)
N 7,1,1 9.687*** 7.942*** -2.438*
(3.630) (2.130) (1.477)
N 5,0,1 7.070*** -1.536
(2.668) (1.094)
N 6,0,1 2.803 -2.237*
(3.393) (1.367)
N 7,0,0 5.002 1.276
(5.377) (2.162)
N 8,0,0 9.126** 2.728
(4.288) (1.752)
Intercept 3.611 3.382** 30.947***
(2.422) (1.476) (1.038)
Includes time period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
rho 0.68 0.41 0.23
Prob > Chi
2 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Obs. 3960 886 3960
TABLE 4: Comparing Individual Behavior and Outcomes across Nodes
Note: N 6,1,0  is the baseline. Random effect tobit regressions with censoring at zero and full 
contributions or GLS. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
22Contributions Punishment Efficiency
Complete -8.042 -2.811* 6.050**
(7.626) (1.487) (3.099)
Connected 5.336*** 0.565 1.398*
(2.055) (0.427) (0.832)
Directed 2.267 2.143*** -4.145**
(4.267) (0.848) (1.733)
Degree (total) 1.435 0.379 -0.899*
(1.357) (0.266) (0.552)
rho 0.698 0.288 0.247
Prob > Chi
2 <0.01 0.10 <0.01
Obs. 3960 4647 3960
TABLE 5: The Effect of Network Properties
Note: Each regression includes time period fixed effects and 
individual random effects. Two-limit Tobits are used for 
contributions and GLS is used for punishment and efficiency. 
Significance levels are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * 
(10%).
23CONNECTED DISCONNECTED
(1) COMPLETE (5) PRISON GUARD
   Fraction(Contributed): 0.56    Fraction(Contributed): 0.33
   Pr(punish 0-contributor): 0.48    Pr(punish 0-contributor): 0.37
   Mean Payoff: 31.64    Mean Payoff: 28.33
(2) DIRECTED CIRCLE (6) LINE
   Fraction(Contributed): 0.60    Fraction(Contributed): 0.25
   Pr(punish 0-contributor): 0.69    Pr(punish 0-contributor): 0.25
   Mean Payoff: 30.02    Mean Payoff: 27.59
(3) UNDIRECTED CIRCLE (7) (disconnected) DIRECTED CIRCLE
   Fraction(Contributed): 0.55    Fraction(Contributed): 0.38
   Pr(punish 0-contributor): 0.42    Pr(punish 0-contributor): 0.51
   Mean Payoff: 28.63    Mean Payoff: 28.14
(4) UNDIRECTED STAR (8) (disconnected) UNDIRECTED CIRCLE
   Fraction(Contributed): 0.51    Fraction(Contributed): 0.45
   Pr(punish 0-contributor): 0.47    Pr(punish 0-contributor): 0.18
   Mean Payoff: 30.68    Mean Payoff: 30.37
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Figure 3. Comparing contributions: Panel (a)-(c) connected versus unconnected net-
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Figure 4. Comparing punishment given (estimated punishment splines): Panel (a)-(c)
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Figure 5. Comparing eﬃciencies: Panel (a)-(c) connected versus unconnected networks.
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Figure 6. Comparing nodes: Panel (a) nodes with 3 out—links and 3 in-links. Panel (b)
nodes with 2 out- and in-links. Panel (c) nodes with 1 out- and in-link and panel (d) those
nodes with no out-links.
29Figure 7. The estimated marginal beneﬁt of adding punishment links.
307 Appendix - Instructions for the Complete Network
Introduction
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making in networks. A research foundation
has provided funds for this research. Your earnings will depend partly on your decisions
and partly on the decisions of the other participants in the experiment. If you follow the
instructions and make decisions carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money.
At this point, take a minute to write down the number of the computer you are using
(it appears on the top of the monitor). At the end of the experiment, you should use your
computer number to claim your earnings. At this time, you will receive $5 as a participation
fee (simply for showing up on time).
During the experiment your payoﬀ will be denominated in experimental tokens that will
be converted into dollars at the end of the experiment at the following rate: 25 Tokens = 1
Dollar.
The Experiment
In this experiment, you will participate in 15 independent and identical (of the same form)
periods each divided into two decision-stages. In each period, you will be assigned to a
position in a four-person network. You will only be able to observe the choices of the other
participants to whom you are connected in this network.
Before the ﬁrst period, you will be randomly assigned to one of the network positions
labeled A, B, C, or D. A fourth of the participants in the room will be designated as type-A
participants, one fourth as type-B participants, one fourth as type-C participants and one
fourth as type-D participants.
Your type depends solely upon chance and will remain constant throughout the experi-
ment. When you are asked to make your ﬁrst decision you will be informed of your type on
the left hand side of the dialog window (see attachment 1). The network is given to you in
the window that appears to the right of it and is illustrated in the scheme below.
A  B 
C  D 
31A line segment between any two types indicates that they are connected and the arrow-
head points to the participant whose action can be observed. A two-way arrowhead indicates
that both connected participants can observe the actions of the other. For example, the two-
way arrowhead between subjects A and D indicates that each can observe the actions of the
other. In the network used in this experiment each type can observe the choices of all the
other types.
Each period of the experiment consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, you will decide
how many tokens you want to allocate in each of two accounts. One account is a private
account which only you beneﬁt from, and the other is a public account which beneﬁts all
four participants in your group equally.
In the second stage of the period, you will observe the choices at the ﬁrst stage of the
participants to whom you are connected by the network. You can then decide whether and
by how much to reduce their earnings from the ﬁrst stage.
Next, we will describe in detail the process that will be repeated in all 15 periods.
Stage One
Each period starts by having the computer randomly form four-person networks by selecting
one participant of type-A, one of type-B, one of type-C and one of type-D. The networks
formed in each period depend solely upon chance and are independent of the networks formed
in any of the other periods.
That is, in any network each participant of type-A is equally likely to be chosen for that
network, and similarly with participants of type-B, type-C and type-D. This is done by the
computer. Hence, if there are 20 participants in the experiment the computer will randomly
form ﬁve groups of four participants in each period.
At the beginning of each period each participant receives an endowment of 25 tokens.
Your task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide how many of the 25
tokens you want to allocate to the public account and how many to your private account.
Your earning in the ﬁrst stage will be determined by how many tokens you allocate to the
private and public accounts and total number of tokens the other participants in your group
allocate to the public account.
To make your allocation decision use the mouse to click on either the Private or Public
input ﬁelds on the lower left hand corner of the dialog window (see attachment 1) and use
the keyboard to ﬁll the number (no decimals) of tokens between 0 and 25 that you wish to
allocate to that account. Note that any of the 25 tokens not assigned to one account will
automatically be allocated to the other. After that, conﬁrm your decision by clicking on the
Submit button. Once you have done this, your decision cannot be revised. This completes
the ﬁrst stage in the period.
32Your earnings at the ﬁrst stage are composed to two parts:
(1) Your earnings from your private account simply equal the tokens in your private
account.
(2) Your earnings from the public account are the total tokens allocated by all the
participants in your group (including yourself) to the public account times 0.4.
Your earnings are given to you on the right hand side of the dialog window (see attachment
1).
Your total earnings in the ﬁrst stage can therefore be summarized by (tokens in private
account)+0.4×(group total tokens in public account).
The earnings of each participant in your group are calculated in the same way. Therefore,
each participant receives the same amount from the public account.
For example, suppose that the total tokens allocated by all the participants in your group
to the public account is 60. Then, each participant in the group receives 0.4×60=24 tokens
from the public account. If you allocated 10 tokens to the public account then your ﬁnal
payoﬀ would be (25-10)+(0.4×60) = 15+24 or 39 tokens.
Similarly, if the total tokens allocated by all the participants in your group to the public
account is 20 then each participant in the group receives 0.4×20=8 tokens from the public
account. If you allocated 10 tokens to the public account your ﬁnal payoﬀ would be (25-
10)+(0.4×20) = 15+8 = 23 tokens.
For each token you allocate to your private account you earn one token. If instead you
allocate this token to the public account the group total would rise by one token. The
earnings of all participants in your group, including yourself, from the public account would
rise by 0.4×1=0.4 tokens each. Thus, the total earnings of the participants in your group
would rise by 1.6 tokens. Also remember that you earn 0.4 tokens for each token allocated
to the public account by any of the other participants in your group.
Stage Two
When everyone in your group has made a decision in the ﬁrst stage, you will observe the
choices of the participants to whom you are connected by the network. For example, if you
are a type-A participant, you will be informed what allocation the type-B, type-C, and the
type-D participants have chosen.
You will observe how many tokens each participant with whom you are connected by the
network allocated to both his or her private and public accounts. This information is given
to you in the large window that appears at the top of the dialog window (see attachment 2).
Each of the other participants will also observe the choices of the participants to whom he
or she is connected by the network. In addition, all participants will be informed about the
total number of tokens allocated by all the participants in your group (including yourself)
33to the public account. This information is given to you right below the large window that
appears at the top of the dialog window (see attachment 2).
At this stage, you have to decide if and by how much you wish to reduce the earnings
from the ﬁrst period of each of the other participants with whom you are connected by the
network. At the same time each of the other participants will decide if and by how much he
or she wishes to reduce the earnings from the ﬁrst period of each of the other participants
with whom he or she is connected by the network.
When you are ready to make your decision, use the mouse to choose the type of participant
in the stage two window (see attachment 2) and use the keyboard to ﬁll the number of tokens
(no decimals) you wish to reduce from that participant’s earnings into the input-text box
that appears to the right of the participant’s type. After that, conﬁrm your decision by
clicking on the Set button.
You must decide by how much you wish to reduce the earnings of each of the other
participants with whom you are connected by the network by ﬁlling a number of tokens for
each of them. If you do not wish to reduce the earnings of another participant you must
enter 0.
Reducing the earnings of other participants is costly. The cost of reducing one token
from any of the other participants is 1/2 token. Each participant can spend up to his or her
ﬁrst stage earnings on reducing the earnings of the other participants with whom he or she
is connected by the network. To keep track of both your current period earnings and your
accumulated earnings from each o the previous periods, there is a text box near the bottom
of the screen (see attachment 2).
After you have entered the amount that you wish to reduce the earnings of each of the
other participants to whom you are connected by the network, conﬁrm your decisions by
clicking on the Submit button (see attachment 2). Once you have done this, your decisions
cannot be revised. This completes the second stage in this period.
When a period ends, the computer will inform all participants of their total earnings,
earnings from private account, earnings from public account, total tokens spent on reducing
others’ earnings, and total tokens reduced by other participants (see attachment 3). After
letting you observe the results, the next period will start by having the computer randomly
forming new groups of participants in networks.
Earnings
Your ﬁnal earnings at the end of each period are determined as follows:
Stage one earnings (your private account balance + your share of the group account).
Minus: the reductions directed at you.
Minus: your expenditure on the reductions directed at other participants.
34Because this sum can be negative, if your expenditures on reductions and the reductions
directed at you are greater than your token earnings from the ﬁrst stage, we will truncate
your earnings at zero. Thus, your earnings from the ﬁrst stage can be reduced at the second
stage to zero but total earnings for the period cannot be negative.
The process will be repeated until all the 15 periods are completed. At the end of the
last period, you will be informed the session has ended. Your ﬁnal earnings will be the sum
of your earnings over the 15 periods.
Rules
Please do not talk with anyone during the experiment. We ask everyone to remain silent
until the end of the last period and then wait for further instructions.
Your participation in the experiment and any information about your earnings will be
kept strictly conﬁdential. Your payments receipt and participant form are the only places in
which your name and social security number are recorded.
If there are no further questions, you are ready to start. An instructor will approach your
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